Abstract. We introduce NSABC/w Nice-Structured Algebraic Block Cipher using w-bit word arithmetic, a 4w-bit analogous of Skipjack [NSA98] with 5w-bit key. The Skipjack's internal 4-round Feistel structure is replaced with a w-bit, 2-round cascade of a binary operation (x, z) → (x z) ≪ (w/2) that permutes a text word x under control of a key word z. The operation , similarly to the multiplication in IDEA [LM91, LMM91], bases on an algebraic group over w-bit words, so it is also capable of decrypting by means of the inverse element of z in the group. The cipher utilizes a secret 4w-bit tweak an easily changeable parameter with unique value for each block encrypted under the same key [LRW02] that is derived from the block index and an additional 4w-bit key. A software implementation for w = 64 takes circa 9 clock cycles per byte on x86-64 processors.
Introduction
In the today's world full of crypto algorithms, one may wonder what makes a block cipher attractive.
In the authors' opinion, the answer to the question is one word: elegance. If something looks nice, then there is a big chance that it is also good.
An elegant specication makes it easier to memorize. Memorability makes it
easier to realize and to analyze, that allows for fruitful cryptanalytic results, leading to deeper understanding which, in turn, makes greater condence in the algorithm.
The elegance comprises the following features:
• Few algebraic operations. Using of many operations results in hardlytractable and possibly undesirable interactions between them.
• Simple and regular key schedule. A complex key schedule, which eectively adds another, unrelated, function to the cipher, results in hardly-tractable and possibly undesirable interactions between the functions.
IDEA, a secure block cipher designed by Xuejia Lai and James L. Massey [LM91, LMM91] is an example of elegance. Besides being elegant with an ecient choice and arrangement of algebraic operations, it is elegant for some more features:
• The use of incompatible group operations, where incompatible means there are no simple relations (such as distributivity) between them. The incompatibility eliminates any exploitable algebraic property thus makes it infeasible to solve the cipher algebraically.
• The use of modular multiplication. Multiplication produces huge mathematical complexity while consuming few clock cycles on modern processors.
It thus greatly contributes to security and eciency of the cipher. Date : May 8th, 2011. This is version 2 of the algorithm, superseding version 1 that was published on Usenet July 2010.
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1 However, IDEA uses multiplication modulo the Fermat prime 2 w + 1 which does not exist for w = 32 or w = 64, making it not extendable to machine word lengths nowadays. Furthermore, its key schedule is rather irregular due to the rotation of the primary key.
Skipjack, a secure block cipher designed by the U.S. National Security Agency [NSA98] , is another example of elegant design. Besides being elegant with an ecient, simple and regular key schedule, it is elegant for one more feature: the use of two ciphers an outer cipher, or wrapper, consisting of rst and last rounds, and an inner cipher, or core, consisting of middle rounds.
The terms core and wrapper were introduced in the design rationale of a structural analogous of Skipjack: the block cipher MARS [IBM98] . MARS's designers justify this two-layer structure by writing that it breaks any repetitious property, it makes any iterative characteristic impossible, and it disallows any propagation of eventual vulnerabilities in either layer to the other one, thus making attacks more dicult. The wrapper is primarily aimed at fast diusion and the core primarily at strong confusion. As Claude E. Shannon termed in his pioneer work [Sha49] , diusion here refers to the process of letting each input bit aect many output bits (or, equivalently, each output bit be aected by many input bits), and confusion here refers to the process of letting that aection very involved, possibly by doing it multiple times in very dierent ways. If a cipher is seen as a polynomial map in the plaintext and the key to the ciphertext, then the methods of diusion and confusion can be described as the eort of making the polynomials as complete as possible, i.e. such that they contain virtually all terms at all degrees. This algebraic approach is very evident in the structure of Skipjack (see Figure 5 .1). Skipjack (as opposed to MARS) was moreover sought elegant as the wrapper there is, in essence, the inverse function of the core.
However, Skipjack uses an S-box that renders it rather slow, hard to program in a secure and ecient manner, and not extendable to large machine word lengths, as such.
This article describes an attempt to combine the elegant idea of using incompatible and complex machine-oriented algebraic operations in IDEA with the elegant structure of Skipjack into a scalable and tweakable block cipher called NSABC Nice-Structured Algebraic Block Cipher.
NSABC is scalable. It is dened for every even word length w. It encrypts a 4w -bit text block under a 5w -bit key, thus allows scaling up with 8-bit increment in block length and 10-bit increment in key length.
NSABC is tweakable. It can use an easily changeable 4w -bit parameter, called tweak [LRW02] , to make a unique version of the cipher for every block encrypted under the same key. Included in the specication is a formula for changing the tweak.
NSABC makes use of entirely the overall structure of Skipjack, including the key schedule, and only replaces the internal 4-round Feistel structure of Skipjack with another structure. The new structure consists of two rounds of the binary operation (x, z) → (x e z) ≪ (w/2), that encrypts a text word x using a key word z and a key-dependent word e. The operation e is derived from an algebraic group over w-bit words taking e as the unit element, so it is also capable of decrypting by means of the inverse element of z in the group. The two rounds are separated by an exclusive-or (XOR) operation that modies the current text word by a tweak word.
NSABC is put in public domain. As it bases on Skipjack, eventual users should be aware of patent(s) that may be possibly held by the U.S. Government and take steps to make sure the use is free of legal issues. We (the designers of NSABC) are not aware of any patent related to other parts of the design.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 denes operations and notations. Section 3 species the cipher. Section 5 gives numerical examples.
Section 4 suggests some implementation techniques. Section 6 concludes the article.
Source code of software implementations are given in the Appendices.
2. Definitions 2.1. Operations on words. Throughout this article, w denotes the machine word length. We use the symbols , , and (.)
−1 to denote addition, subtraction (and arithmetic negation), multiplication and multiplicative inversion, respectively, modulo 2 w (unless otherwise said). We use the symbols ¬ and ⊕ to denote bit-wise complement and exclusive-or (XOR) on w-bit operands (unless otherwise said).
We write x ≪ n to denote leftward rotation (i. e. cyclic shift toward the most signicant bit) of x, that is always a w-bit word, by n bits. For even w, the symbol (.) S denotes swapping the high and low order halves, i.e. x S = x ≪ (w/2).
Let's dene binary operation by
x y = 2xy x y and binary operation by x y = 2xy x y
The bivariate polynomials on the right hand side are permutation polynomials in either variable for every xed value of the other variable [Riv99] . In other words, and are quasi-group operations.
Furthermore, is a group operation over the set of w-bit numbers 1 . This fact becomes obvious by considering an alternative denition for the operation [Mey97] :
it can be done by dropping the rightmost bit, which is always 1, of the product modulo 2 w+1 of the operands each appended with an 1 bit. Symbolically,
The group dened by is thus isomorphic to the multiplicative group of odd integers modulo 2 w+1 , via the isomorphism
The unit (i.e., identity) element of the group is 0. The inverse element of x, denotedx, isx
The following relations are obvious.
Since the unary operator is an involution, the following relations hold.
(x y) z = x (y z)
x 0 = 0 Notice that 0 is the right unit element w.r.t. the operation . Hence (x y) ȳ = x which means thatȳ is also the right inverse element of y w. r. t. the operation. Since (¬x) x = 1 holds for every x, the following relations hold.
(¬x) y = ¬(x y)
(1 x) y = 1 (x y)
Let e be a xed w-bit number. Let's dene binary operations e and e by x e y = (x e) (y e) e = 2xy (1 − 2e)(x + y − e)
x e y = (x e) (y e) e = 2xy (1 − 2e)(x − y + e) Notice that e is also the right unit element w. r. t.
e
, and e y also the right inverse element of y w. r. t.
e . The operation e , which is non-commutative and non-associative, will be used for encryption and, due to the existence of right inversion, also for decryption. For examples, z y x and 43 210 are in string notation, (x, y, z) and (0, 1, 2, 3, 4)
are in tuple notation.
The string notation indicates high-rst order: the rst (i.e. leftmost) symbol denotes the most signicant part of the value when it is interpreted as a number.
Conversely, the tuple notation indicates low-rst order: the rst symbol denotes the least signicant part of the value when it is interpreted as a number.
For examples, to interpret a 3-word number, x 2 denotes the most signicant word of x 2 x 1 x 0 and x 0 denotes the least signicant word of (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ). If, for example x, y, z, t are 1-digit, 2-digit, 3-digit and 4-digit values respectively, then (x, y, z, t) = 9876543210 means x = 0, y = 21, z = 543 and t = 9876.
Note that the string notation and number notation being used as synonyms does not mean that big-endian data ordering is mandated. In order to avoid security irrelevant details, we do not specify endianess. We nevertheless provide a reference implementations in C++, where every octet string is considered as a [generally multi-word] number with the rst octet taken as the least signicant one. The implementation thus interprets octet strings as numbers in little-endian order.
Operations on word strings. Let (.)
R denote the permutation that reverses the word order of a non-empty word string. For example, for w = 8,
S denote the permutation that swaps the high order and low order halves of every word of a non-empty word string. For example, for w = 8,
The operator ⊕ on word strings denote word-wise application of ⊕. For example,
Unless otherwise said, operators and on word strings denote word-wise modular addition and subtraction, respectively. For example, Operations on word strings are used in this article only to express the decryption function explicitly.
Specification
This section provides details of NSABC/w. From now on w, the word length, must be even.
Throughout this article, X denotes a 4w -bit plaintext block, Y a 4w -bit ciphertext block, Z a 5w -bit key, T a 4w -bit secret tweak, i.e., a value that is used to encrypt only one block under the key, U a w-bit unit key, i.e. an additional key that generates right unit elements for the underlying quasi-groups.
Tweaking is optional. It may be disabled by keeping T constant (like Z and U ) while encrypting many blocks. When tweaking is disabled, NSABC becomes a conventional, non-tweakable, block cipher. 
ENCRYPT(X, Z, T, U ) = CRYPT(X, KE(Z), UE(U ), TE(T ))
An explicit relation for ENCRYPT is given in Algorithm 1. An explicit relation for DECRYPT is given in Algorithm 7.
Mechanically, encryption is performed on a conceptual processor with a 4-word text register (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), a 5-word key register (z 0 , z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ), a 4-word tweak register (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ) and a word unit register u. The key register is initially loaded with the key Z. The tweak register is initially loaded with the tweak T. The unit register is initially loaded with the unit key U. The text register is initially loaded with the plaintext block X and nally it contains the ciphertext block Y. For k-th round, 0 ≤ k ≤ 31, the text word x 0 is permuted, i.e. it is updated by an execution unit called G-box that implements a permutation G on the set of word values, and the contents of the text word x 0 are mixed, by exclusive-or (XOR), into an other text word that is either x 1 or x 3 . The order of operations and the target of mixing depend on the round type:
• For an A-typed round (see Figure 3 .1 part A), G applies rst, then the mixing takes place and targets x 1 . That is, the contents of x 0 enters the Gbox, the output value of the G-box is stored back to x 0 , then the contents of x 0 and x 1 are XOR'ed and the result is stored to x 1 . The words x 2 and x 3 are left unchanged.
• For a B-typed round (see Figure 3 .1 part B), the mixing takes place and targets x 3 rst, then G applies. That is, the contents of x 0 and x 3 are XOR'ed and the result is stored to x 3 , then the contents of x 0 enters the G-box, the output value of the G-box is stored back to x 0 . The words x 1 and x 2 are left unchanged.
Besides the text input, the G-box also takes as its inputs an ordered pair of w-bit key words (K 2k , K 2k+1 ) (depicted by in Fig. 3.1 and 3.2) , an ordered pair of w-bit unit words (L 2k , L 2k+1 ) (depicted by in Fig. 3.1 and 3. 2), and a w-bit tweak word C k (depicted by D in Fig. 3.1 and 3.2) . The details on how key words, unit words and tweak words are generated and used will be given in the subsequent subsections. 
For 0 k < 32:
The encryption round is completed with a rotation by one word toward the least signicant word on the text register, i.e. the text register is modied by simultaneous loading the word x 0 with the contents of the word x 1 , x 1 with the contents of x 2 , x 2 with the contents of x 3 , and x 3 with the contents of x 0 .
3.2. Tweak schedule. The tweak register (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ) is initially loaded with the tweak T. The tweak words are generated in 32 rounds of operations.
For k-th round, 0 ≤ k ≤ 31, the value of the word t 0 of the tweak register is taken as the tweak word C k [which enters the G-box in the k-th encryption round]. Then, 
3 ) = T similarly to the text register, the tweak register is rotated by one word toward the least signicant word (see Figure 3 .1).
NOTE. For T 3 T 2 T 1 T 0 = T , the tweak schedule is
3.3. Key schedule. The key register (z 0 , z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ) is initially loaded with the key Z. The key words are generated in 64 rounds of operations. For k-th round, 0 ≤ k ≤ 63, the value of the word z 3 of the key register is taken as the key word K k [which enters the G-box of the k/2-th encryption round as the rst key word if k is even, or as the second key word if k is odd]. The key register is then rotated by one word toward the least signicant word. The rotation is similar to that on the text register and the tweak register. (See Figure 3.1.) NOTE. For Z 4 Z 3 Z 2 Z 1 Z 0 = Z, the key schedule is
3.4. Unit schedule. The unit register u is initially loaded with the unit key U.
Unit words are generated in 64 rounds of operations. 
1 , z
2 , z
3 , z 
3.5. G-box. The G-box implements a permutation G (see Figure 3 .2) that takes as argument a text word and is parametrized by an ordered pair of key words
, an ordered pair of unit words (L 0 , L 1 ) and a tweak word C 0 to return a text word as the result. The G-box operates on a word register that initially contains the argument and nally contains the result. The G-box proceeds in two swapping the contents of its high and low order halves.
For the inter-round XOR operation, the register is modied by XOR'ing its contents with the tweak word C 0 and storing the result back to it.
For the second round, the register is processed similarly to the rst round with K 1 and L 1 being used instead of K 0 and L 0 , respectively.
NOTES.
(1) The cipher uses 64 distinct instances from the family of operations e .
(2) Alternatively, it may be seen as using 64 identical instances of the single operation or , but operands and result of each instance are biased by adding or subtracting the constant L 0 (or L 1 ) that is specic to the instance, and furthermore, being seen as , the left operand enters and the result leaves it in altered sign.
(3) Like Skipjack, the G-box permutes K 0 (or K 1 ) while keeping x and other parameters xed. Unlike Skipjack, the G-box doesn't permute the word (Hi(K 0 ), Lo(K 1 )) where Hi(.) and Lo(.) stand for the high and the low order half respectively.
(4) Unlike Skipjack, diusion in the G-box is incomplete, i.e. not every input bit aects all output bits. Indeed, the v-th bit of the argument, with v > w/2, aects only all bits of the low order half and bits v through w − 1 of the result; bits w/2 through v − 1 remain unaected. Pseudo-code: NOTES.
(1) The full cipher is illustrated in Figure 3 .3, where (2) The overall structure is up to word indexing identical to that of Skipjack.
The word re-indexing, which is cryptographically insignicant, was introduced to ease description and illustration.
(3) Like Skipjack, decryption is similar to encryption. To decrypt with Skipjack, one swaps adjacent words in the cipher and the plain block and swaps adjacent word pairs in the key. To decrypt with NSABC, one reverses the word order, i.e., swaps the rst and the last words as well as the second rst and the second last ones in the text block, the tweak and the key.
For Skipjack, one also swaps high and low order halves of every word. For NSABC, one swaps high and low order halves of every word but that of the key.
(4) Unlike Skipjack, just swapping the words and half-words doesn't turn encryption into decryption one needs to invert key words too. Thus although ENCRYPT and DECRYPT can be expressed explicitly in terms of CRYPT,
DECRYPT cannot be expressed explicitly in terms of ENCRYPT.
3.7. Tweak derivation. The 4w -bit secret tweak T is used to encrypt only one block [under a given key Z and unit key U ]. In order to encrypt multiple blocks the tweak is derived from the block index and a 4w -bit [additional] key, called tweak key, as follows. Let T (j) denote the tweak used to encrypt j -th block. For the rst block (j = 0), the tweak key is used as the tweak directly:
The subsequent tweak is computed from the current tweak by the recurrent relation: 
(2) For ecient random access, applications may opt to use non-at spaces of the block index j. For example, an application that encrypts relational databases may dene the index in the format j = j 4 j 3 j 2 j 1 j 0 , where j 4 is database number, j 3 is table number within the database, j 2 is row number within the table, j 1 is eld number within the row and j 0 is block number within the eld.
(3) Tweaking must be disabled when the cipher is used as a permutation, i. e.
to generate a sequence of unique numbers. the contents of all registers at the start of round k for k = 0, 1, 2, ..., 64 for key schedule and unit schedule, and k = 0, 1, 2, ..., 32 for tweak schedule and text encryption. The start of round 64 (32) conveniently means the end of round 63
(31), which is that of the entire algorithm.
Notes on implementation
This section provides methods for ecient software implementation for two types of environment: memory-constrained, such as embedded computers, and memoryabundant, such as servers and personal computers.
5.1. Memory-constrained environment. The function ENCRYPT can be implemented without using any writeable memory on a processor with at least 16 word registers:
• 4 for (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) text register • 5 for (z 0 , z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ) key register • 4 for (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ) tweak register
• 1 for u unit register,
• 1 for the constant value 2U 1, and
• 1 for k round index. Indeed, the schedules K, L and C can vanish because every word of them, once produced, can be consumed immediately, provided that the functions KE, TE, UE and CRYPT are programmed to run in parallel and synchronized with each increment of k. Source code of this implementation is given in Appendix A.
Unlike ENCRYPT, DECRYPT needs memory for the key schedule because onthe-y modular multiplicative inversion is too slow to be practical. In this environment, modes of operation that avoid DECRYPT (i.e. ones using ENCRYPT to decrypt) are thus preferable. The procedure may be also coded twice, i.e. it may be run in two instances in parallel on a single core of the processor, with the second instance delayed by a few steps after the rst, to encrypt two blocks possibly under dierent tweaks and/or keys. This method has shown to be eective for x86-64 processors in 64-bit mode, resulting in about 9 clock cycles per byte.
Conclusion
We dened NSABC, a block cipher utilizing a group operation that is essentially modular multiplication of machine words, a powerful operation available on many processors.
NSABC was meant to be elegant. It uses no S-boxes or magic constants. It uses only machine word-oriented algebraic operations. It makes use of the simple and regular structure of Skipjack which has become publicly known for over a decade sucient time to be truly understood. It is elegant to be easily memorizable, realizable and analyzable.
NSABC bases on some valuable design of a well-reputed agency in the branch.
We therefore believe that it is worth analysis and it can withstand rigorous analysis.
If this happens to be true, then we may have a practical cipher with 256-bit blocks, allowing to encrypt enormous amount of data under the same key, and with 320-bit keys, allowing to protect data over every imaginable time. In cipher design there is always a trade-o between security and eciency, and designers always have to ask: What do we want, a very strong and fairly fast cipher, or fairly strong but very fast?
NSABC reects the authors' view on the dilemma. If Skipjack is regarded as very strong and just fairly fast, then NSABC may be regarded as a design emphasizing the second aspect make it very fast, abeit just fairly strong. For w-bit word length, NSABC key length is 5w bits, optionally plus 5w bits more, whilst the true level of security is yet to be determined. On the other hand, on a modern 64-bit processor it takes only 9 clock cycles to encrypt a byte.
NSABC is thus fast to be comparable to every modern block cipher. 
